ABSTRACT Replacement of the subsea control module (SCM) and halting production caused by the failure of the SCM are costly, and the electrical control system plays a large role in the failure modes of the SCM. Hence, the analysis of its reliability and safety is important. Markov processes and the multiple beta factor model are used to model the reliability and safety for the electrical control system of the SCM that consider the effects of multiple factors, including the failure detection rate, common-cause failure, and the failure rate of each module, for evaluating system reliability and safety. The Morris screening method that is based on a large amount of random data with equal probability is applied to reliability and safety models that vary with time for quantifying the effect levels of each factor on the system reliability and safety in the time interval. The effect of each factor on the system and its interaction degree with other factors are evaluated in the time interval. Finally, the system model is simulated in MATLAB. The simulation demonstrates that the system reliability and safety gradually decrease and the effect of each factor on them increases over time; the reliability is most sensitive to the failure rates of the input, central processing unit, and output modules, whereas the safety is most sensitive to the failure detection rate. The common-cause failure and the comparator module have some effects on the reliability and safety of the system. INDEX TERMS Markov processes, Morris screening method, multiple beta factor (MBF) model, reliability, safety, sensitivity, subsea control module.
I. INTRODUCTION
In offshore oil and gas exploitation, the typical subsea production system (SPS) adopts the multiplexed electro-hydraulic subsea control system. The most important subsea control module (SCM) of the subsea control system (SCS) is installed in the subsea production facilities, such as Xmas tree and manifold etc [1] . The SCM performs control functions and acquires data from subsea sensors that are installed in the SCM, subsea equipment and pipelines.
As the core of the SPS, the SCM faces substantial environmental, safety, and reliability challenges. According to the survey data, well interventions in subsea deep-water wells cost over $200,000 per day, with a typical cost of $10M per intervention, including operations that are typically conducted by a floating deep-water drilling rig, except the loss of production [2] . A recent study shows that the SCM has the highest production loss in the SPS [3] . Therefore, failure of the SCM could lead to a huge loss in production, environmental issues, and uneconomical field developments with substantial safety risks [4] .
In the structure of the SCM system, the electrical control system accounts for a large proportion in the failure modes of the SCM; hence, the study of its reliability and safety is of high significance for improving the reliability and safety of the SCM [5] . At present, most control systems utilize fault-tolerance technology to improve reliability.
The electrical control system of the SCM is usually designed as a fault-tolerant system [6] . Common faulttolerant systems include the double hot standby system [7] , the all-voting triple modular redundancy (AVTMR) system [8] , [9] , the 2-out-of-2 redundancy system, and the double 2-out-of-2 redundancy system etc [10] . The double hot standby system has high reliability but lacks a data comparison mechanism; hence, data safety is difficult to guarantee. The 2-out-of-2 redundancy system is equivalent to a serial system, which is a safety redundancy system. Because the AVTMR and double 2-out-of-2 redundancy system have both data comparison and redundancy mechanism, their performances are better. However, the double 2-out-of-2 redundancy system has two subsystem, and two redundant subsea electronic modules (SEMs) are usually set up within the SCM. Therefore, the double 2-out-of-2 redundancy system is the most suitable for the electrical control system of the SCM.
The study of the reliability and safety of the SCM has not been sufficiently extensive. Fabbri [1] introduced requirements and characteristics of multiplexed electro-hydraulic subsea control systems and presented basic methods for reliability analysis and testing based on experience. Umofia [11] and Kolios et al. [12] combined failure mode, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) and the conventional risk priority number (RPN) technique to analyze the reliability of the SCM, which revealed the most critical failure modes for the SCM. Broadbent [13] collected and analyzed all the subsea reliability data in a database, namely, the subsea master, and concluded that the reliability of SCM was not as high as expected and early life failure was a major problem. Lee et al. [4] qualitatively analyzed the failure modes and consequences of events of the SPS and calculated the system reliability via the Monte Carlo simulation method based on reliability block diagram (RBD) and generic data such as offshore and onshore reliability data (OREDA). However, the above methods cannot analyze the effect of each factor on the system very well.
A series of reliability analysis methods have been proposed in the last decades. Common reliability analysis methods include the failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis (FMECA), the fault tree analysis (FTA), the Bayesian networks (BNs), the Petri nets (PNs), and the Markov processes etc [14] , [15] . FMECA is used to identify the potential failure modes of each of the functional blocks of a system and to study the effects of these failures on the system, it can be used for qualitative and quantitative analysis of the reliability. FMECA is usually the basis for further reliability analysis. FTA yields all possible combinations of potential failures and events that may cause a specified system failure. It can be used for qualitative and quantitative analysis of a reliability model; however, it is difficult to establish the reliability of a complex redundant system via FTA while considering multiple effecting factors independently. Bayesian networks are increasingly used in reliability predictive and diagnostic analysis because the model can perform forward and backward analyses. Cai et al. [16] proposed a Bayesian network model of the redundant control system of the subsea blowout preventer that takes into account the common-cause failure and imperfect coverage, and evaluated the reliability of the system and the effect of each factor on the system. Liu et al. [17] presented a novel approach for constructing a Bayesian network from the GO model to establish a reliability model of the closing subsea blowout preventer; sensitivity analysis was also performed. A dynamic Bayesian network is a Bayesian network that connects multiple variables via the adjacent time step. Cai et al. [18] , [19] proposed a dynamic Bayesian network model of the electrical control system and mechanical system of the subsea blowout preventer system that takes into account common-cause failure, imperfect coverage, imperfect repair and preventive maintenance, and evaluated the reliability of the system and the effect of each factor on the system. In addition, they established an evaluation model of the engineering resilience metric using dynamic Bayesian networks and demonstrate the application of the proposed resilience metric and its corresponding evaluation methodology in common systems [20] . Although the Bayesian network is a very effective reliability analysis method, it relies on a database and requires a large amount of data for learning and updating; hence, it is more suitable for real-time reliability prediction and diagnosis of the system. A Petri net (PN) is a powerful tool for reliability models, which consists of places, transitions and directed arcs. PNs are suitable for modeling and analyzing systems with parallelization, synchronization, and confliction, but are limited to large systems and their solutions typically are usually converted to Markov models. Liu et al. [21] presented the stochastic Petri net (SPN) model of the multiplex control system of a subsea blowout preventer and a numerical analysis method that is based on the isomorphic continuous-time Markov chain of the model. Markov processes have been widely used in various fields due to their flexibility for the reliability analysis of complex systems. Based on Markov processes, Liu et al. [22] , [24] and Cai et al. [23] proposed a reliability model for the electrical control system and mechanical system of a subsea blowout preventer system with common-cause failure and evaluated the reliability of the system and the effect of each factor on the system. Zeng and Zio [25] proposed a quantitative model of business continuity based on event tree and semiMarkovian models, the model can be used to quantify the business continuity metrics. Kim et al. [26] presented a reliability model for the AVTMR and a dual-duplex system that is based on Markov processes, and calculated and compared the reliabilities of the systems. Wang et al. [27] designed a faulttolerant computer control system and combined hierarchical and Markov modeling methods for reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS) analysis of the computer system to evaluate the system characteristics. Liu et al. [7] established reliability models for various typical redundant safety architectures of the train control system that are based on Markov processes and used MATLAB to simulate and analyze their reliability. Zhou et al. [28] presented an analytical reliability study that is based on the homogeneous VOLUME 7, 2019 Markov process in ''Triplex Channels & Single Module'' and ''Double Channels & Double Modules'' for a flight control computer and proposed the index of fault tolerant capability. The Markov processes are the most flexible reliability analysis method. Although it has the limitations of state space explosion and a binary variable, it can be simplified via state combination. It is highly suitable for general complex systems and can easily yield an analytical or numerical solution of the model via the transfer rate matrix, which is very convenient for model analyses such as sensitivity analysis. The studies that are discussed above applied various reliability analysis methods to evaluate the reliability of the corresponding system and analyzed effects of various factors on the system. However, they do not analyze deeply the safety of the system in the model and the effect level of each factor on the system reliability and safety has not been quantified.
In the operation of a redundant system, common-cause failure (CCF) can lead to severe reliability and safety degradation, which is one of the factors that cannot be ignored in reliability analysis. The current modeling methods of common-cause failure mainly include the α-factor model [29] , [30] , the beta factor model [31] , the multiple beta factor (MBF) model [32] , the multiple Greek letter (MGL) model [33] , the basic parameter (BP) model [34] , the binomial failure rate (BFR) model [35] , and the multiple error shock (MESH) model [36] etc. In addition, Fan et al. [37] developed a new model for CCFs considering components degradation based on Stochastic Hybrid System (SHS), the model can accurately describe the CCF effect on the reliability of a system with degrading components. Among them, the β-factor (i.e. beta factor) model is the simplest and most flexible; however, it is limited to systems for which the multiplicity is greater than two. Most other models use multiple factors to describe CCFs of any multiplicity. However, the MBF model is expanded on the basis of the β-factor model. It is assumed that all CCFs are developed on the basis of the CCF of two components, and β is taken as the basic parameter to represent the CCF. Therefore, MBF has high flexibility and practicality in the sensitivity analysis of CCFs.
Sensitivity analysis is very important for evaluating the effects of input parameters on the model output and it can determine the effect level of each input parameter on the output. The current sensitivity analysis methods include the direct differential method, the GLUE method [38] , the Morris screening method [39] , [40] , and the Sobol sensitivity analysis method [41] . The Morris screening method is widely used in sensitivity analysis; however, it is not applicable in reliability and safety models that vary with time, and sensitivity in the time interval is not defined.
Based on the above issues, Markov processes and the MBF model are used to model the reliability and safety for the electrical control system of the SCM. The effects of multiple factors are considered, including the failure detection rate, common-cause failure, and failure rate of each module. Morris screening method that is based on a large amount of random data with equal probability is applied to reliability and safety models that vary with time for quantifying the effect level of each factor on the system reliability and safety in the time interval.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section II, an electrical control system of the SCM with a 2-out-of 2 redundancy system is introduced. In Section III, a Markov processes and the MBF modelling method are combined and the reliability and safety models of the electrical control system of the SCM are established. In Section IV, the calculation methods of reliability and safety are described based on the established model and the application of Morris screening method to the reliability and safety models is described. The reliability, safety and sensitivity are simulated in MATLAB in Section V and the conclusions of this study are presented in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM INTRODUCTION A. SUBSEA CONTROL SYSTEM
A typical multiplexed electro-hydraulic subsea control system consists of a topside part and a subsea part. The topside part includes the master control station (MCS), hydraulic power unit (HPU), electrical power unit (EPU), and chemical injection unit (CIU) etc. The subsea part includes the subsea distribution unit (SDU), subsea equipment (Xmas tree), and SCM etc. The architecture of the multiplexed electro-hydraulic subsea control system is illustrated in Fig. 1 [42] . The process of the system operation is as follows: 1) The signal, chemical, electrical, and hydraulic power from the topside are distributed in the SDU to realize communication, chemical injection, and power supply.
2) The MCS sends the command signals to the SCM through the umbilical cable to control the subsea production facility. At the same time, the SCM collects the signals from the subsea sensors to monitor the state of the SPS.
3) The EPU supplies electrical power from an uninterruptible power supply (UPS).
4) The HPU supplies hydraulic power that is stabilized by an accumulator skid. 5) The CIU supplies a chemical to the SCM through the umbilical cable.
According to the functions, the SCM can be divided into the electrical control system, hydraulic system, and mechanical system.
B. ELECTRICAL CONTROL SYSTEM OF THE SUBSEA CONTROL MODULE
To improve the reliability and safety of the electrical control system of the SCM, a double 2-out-of-2 redundancy system is employed [26] . The electrical control system of the SCS includes the work station, umbilical cable, and electrical control system of the SCM. A configuration diagram of the electrical control system of the SCS is shown in Fig. 2 . The work station is located on the offshore production platform, which is composed of the MCS and the engineer station. The work station is the core of the subsea control system for controlling, monitoring, and communicating within the system. The SCM is typically installed on a subsea production facility to receive commands from the MCS and control subsea equipment (Xmas tree). It also collects signals from subsea sensors and transmits the signals to the MCS for data processing and decision making.
The MCS can be operated in two modes: the mode of the engineer station and the mode of the human machine interface (HMI). The engineer station takes priority in controlling and monitoring the entire SCS and saves, exports, and prints data on the current production and historical record. The HMI only controls and monitors the system.
The SEM, which is located in the SCM, is full of nitrogen with an absolute pressure of 1 bar. The shell of the SEM is typically made of super duplex stainless steel to withstand the pressure of the subsea and remains sealed [7] . Because of the limited space on the subsea production facilities and the tendency of the SEM to dominate the SCM volume, the SEM must be designed as small as possible. However, the double 2-out-of-2 redundancy system is composed of two subsystems that are hot standby redundant to each other. The SEM is composed of SEM-A and SEM-B, as required by the double 2-out-of-2 redundancy design. This makes the VOLUME 7, 2019 two subsystems more independent and reduces the interaction degree between them.
The photoelectric module is installed in the SEM to communicate between the SEM and the work station via the optical fiber within the umbilical cable.
SEM-A and SEM-B are the same in terms of structure and configuration: each subsystem consists of two CPU modules, two input modules, two output modules, and a comparator module and all modules have the failure detection function. SEM-A and SEM-B act as a hot standby for each other. When the system is running normally, one of them is the active subsystem and the other is the standby subsystem. The two input modules in the active subsystem collect and transmit the data from the subsea sensors to two CPU modules through the data bus. The two CPU modules compare the two collected data packs. When the data are analog signals, if the difference between the values is within the allowable range, the average value is selected; otherwise, failure is reported to the MCS. When the data are digital signals, if the two values are the same, the intersection is selected; otherwise, failure is reported to the MCS. Then, command signals from the CPU modules are sent to the corresponding two output modules. After receiving the command, the output modules send the signals to the comparator. The comparator compares the output signals from the two output modules. If the comparison result is consistent (true), it outputs the signal to the terminal device. Otherwise, it indicates that a failure has occurred in the active subsystem and the system sends a failure signal to the MCS, which reports the active subsystem failure. The system is switched to the standby subsystem. Then, the standby subsystem acts as the active subsystem and the failed active subsystem is downgraded to a standby subsystem to keep the system working. In particular, to ensure the safety of the system, the control switch can be operated in automatic and manual modes. If a failure also occurs in the standby subsystem, the system is set to the failure state and the safe output mode.
In the above process, the standby subsystem will perform the same tasks, except the comparator of the standby subsystem will not output control signals after it performs a comparison. However, the standby subsystem always remains ready to take over the tasks of the active subsystem.
III. SYSTEM RELIABILITY MODELLING
The SCM is fixed on a subsea production facility. After failure of the SCM, the engineering vessel is required to retrieve the SCM using multi-purpose running tool (MPRT). Because the cost of the halt production and the engineering vessel is very high, when the SCM is retrieved to topside because of the failure, a new SCM is installed on the subsea production facility immediately, rather than repairing the failed SCM first. The malfunctioning SCM is transported to the factory for the follow-up maintenance and repair [43] . Therefore, determining how to increase the reliability and safety of the electrical control system of the SCM is extremely important for minimizing related costs. Hence, the maintenance is not considered in the model. Because the failure detection rate, common-cause failure and failure rate of each module have substantial effects on the reliability and safety of the system, their effects on the system should be considered in the modelling.
A. COMMON-CAUSE FAILURE MODEL
In the MBF model, the beta factor model is extended by adding parameters. Consider a system with N components. Suppose that a failure has occurred and all k of these components are known to have failed. Then, β k is the probability that also a specified one of the other N − k components has failed at the same time. These probabilities (β k ) are not affected by the total number of components (N ). In the model, β = β 1 is maintained as an essential parameter. The independent failure rate of a specified module and the dependent failure rate of k(k = 2, 3, 4) specified modules are respectively represented by λ 1 and λ k and expressed as follows:
and
where λ is the total failure rate of a specified component. C 1 -C 4 is used to replace the coefficient of the formula in (1) and simplified equations can be obtained as follows:
In practice, the selections of β 2 and β 3 are based on experience, and they are usually constants: β 2 = 0.3 and β 3 = 0.5 [32] ; the value of β varies in different control system and working environment [44] . Because there are only two comparators in the electrical control system of the SCM, it can be analyzed via the traditional beta factor model.
B. FAILURE DETECTION MODEL
Regarding the failure detection rate c of the system, the system failure includes detectable and undetectable failures. Based on (3), the failure rate of one or more components can be expressed as,
where k = 1, 2, 3, 4; λ D1 and λ U1 are the detectable and undetectable independent failure rates, respectively, of a component; and λ Dk and λ Uk are the detectable and undetectable dependent failure rates, respectively, of k (k = 2, 3, 4) components. Similarly, the detectable and undetectable failure rates of the comparator can be obtained.
C. DEFINITIONS OF PARAMETERS IN THE MODEL
The symbolic definitions, typical values and value ranges of the parameters that are used in the system modelling are listed in Table 1 . The typical values and values ranges of parameters are selected based on [16] , [31] , and [45] . 
D. MARKOV RELIABILITY MODELLING WITH MULTIPLE FACTORS 1) ASSUMPTIONS
In the reliability analysis of the electrical control system of the SCM, the following assumptions are made:
1) The system starts from the perfect state and all modules operate well.
2) At the beginning, SEM-A is active and SEM-B is in hot standby mode.
3) At any moment, the only one module in the system will fail, except in the case of common-cause failure.
4) When a common-cause failure occurs, only the same components fail simultaneously and the heterogeneous components will not fail at the same time.
5) Switch and photoelectric modules are fully reliable.
6) The failure rate of each module is constant with respect to time.
7) The failure detection rate of each module is c.
8) The common-cause failure factor of each module is β.
9) The effects of cumulative failures are not considered.
10) The time of failure detection is not considered due to the system self-test is run in real time.
11) The time to perform the safe output function when the system fails is not considered.
12) All hidden failures of SCM are considered as dangerous failures due to that SCM has not functional proof test and can only detect failures by self-test.
2) SYSTEM STATE DECOMPOSITION AND RELIABILITY MODELLING
According to the failure mode of the SCM, the system reliability will be analyzed in five cases: 1) A detectable independent failure of a single module occurs.
2) An undetectable independent failure of a single module occurs.
3) Detectable dependent failures of two modules of the same type in a subsystem occur simultaneously due to a common-cause failure.
4) Undetectable dependent failures of two modules of the same type in a subsystem occur simultaneously due to a common-cause failure.
5) Dependent failures of two or more modules of the same type in subsystem A and subsystem B occur simultaneously due to a common-cause failure.
The system state transition diagram is shown in Fig. 3 22, 22, 11) indicates that one input module, two CPU modules, two output modules and one comparator module in subsystem A or subsystem B operate properly (one of the input modules fails) and all modules of the other subsystem operate properly. In the state, ''#'' indicates that a detectable failure of one input module in subsystem A or subsystem B occurs. In state S08 (22, 22, 22, 10 * ), '' * '' indicates that an undetectable failure of a comparator module in subsystem B occurs. In state S13 (20 * , 22, 22, 11), because there are two input modules in every subsystem, '' * '' indicates that an undetectable failure occurs in both input modules in subsystem B due to a common-cause failure.
Due to the complexity of the state transitions in the system, the rates at which each state transfers to the failure safe state and failure dangerous state are represented by the expressions of F K S and F K D (K = 1-28), which are presented in the following analysis.
In the first case (S01, S02, S03, and S04), if a detectable independent failure occurs in the active subsystem, the system is switched to the standby subsystem quickly by the switch. If a detectable independent failure occurs in the standby subsystem, the system is not switched, but becomes a 2-out-of-2 redundancy system.
In the second case (S05, S06, S07, S08, and S09), there are two subcases: one is that any one of the input, CPU or output modules in the subsystem has an undetectable independent failure (S05, S06, and S07); the other is that the comparator in the subsystem has an undetectable independent failure (S08 and S09). In the former subcase, although the failure cannot be detected directly, it can be detected indirectly via data comparison. For example, the failure of a single input module can be identified via data comparison in the CPU module and the failure of a single CPU module and/or output module can be identified by the comparator. At this time, if a failure occurs in the active subsystem, the system can be switched to the standby subsystem. If the standby subsystem fails, the system will not be switched, but will become a 2-out-of-2 redundancy system. In the latter subcase, because there is only one comparator in each subsystem, when an undetectable comparator failure (S09) occurs in the active subsystem, whether the comparator performs predetermined logic is uncertain after receiving data from two output modules. In other words, when the comparator module receives the command ''open the valve'', it may output the command ''close the valve'', which is very dangerous. Therefore, the system is considered in a dangerous state in this case. If an undetectable comparator failure (S08) occurs in the standby subsystem, the system operates normally, but the standby subsystem is in a dangerous state. When the system is switched to the standby subsystem due to a failure in the active subsystem, the system is in dangerous state S24.
In the third case (S10, S11, and S12), two modules of the same type have detectable failures simultaneously due to a common-cause failure in the subsystem. At this time, the system processing is the same as in the first case.
In the fourth case (S13, S14, S15, S16, S17, and S18), there are two subcases: one is that any two modules with the same type of input, CPU or output in the active subsystem have undetectable failures (S14, S16, and S18) simultaneously; the other is that the above failure also occurs in the standby subsystem (S13, S15, and S17). In the former subcase, the system state is the same as state S09. In the latter subcase, the system state is the same as state S08.
In the fifth case, there are three subcases: The first is that any one input, CPU or output module in the active subsystem and a module of the same type in the standby subsystem fail due to a common-cause failure; in this case, the system will switch to the failure safe state (S19). The second is that three or four input, CPU or output modules of the same type in two subsystems fail due to a common-cause failure. If the failure is detectable, the system switches to state S19; if the failure is undetectable, the system switches to dangerous state (S20). The last subcase is that two comparator modules fail due to a common-cause failure; the result is the same as in the second subcase and depends on whether the failure is detectable.
In the first through fourth cases above, the states can also be switched to failure safe states (S21, S23, S25 and S27) and dangerous states (S22, S24, S26 and S28). Consider S01 as an example to analyze how the states transfer to state S21 according to the number of module failures and whether they can be detected. The system will switch to S21 in the following cases: 1) Any one module without the comparator in the active subsystem has a detectable or undetectable failure.
2) The comparator module in the active subsystem has a detectable failure.
3) Any two modules of the same type have a detectable failure due to a common-cause failure in the active subsystem.
4) The input module that has not failed in the failed subsystem and any one input module in the active subsystem have a detectable or undetectable failure due to a common-cause failure.
5) Any one CPU or output module in the failed subsystem and any one module of the same type in the active subsystem have a detectable or undetectable failure due to a common-cause failure.
6) The input module that has not failed in the failed subsystem and two input modules in the active subsystem have a detectable failure due to a common-cause failure. 7) Any one CPU or output module in the failed subsystem and two modules of the same type in the active subsystem have a detectable failure due to a common-cause failure. 8) Two CPU or output modules in the failed subsystem and any one module of the same type in the active subsystem have a detectable or undetectable failure due to a common-cause failure. 9) All CPU or output modules in the system have a detectable failure due to a common-cause failure.
The other states are similar to S01 and are not repeated here. The transition rates from all states to failure safe states and dangerous states are listed in Table 2 .
IV. CALCULATION METHODS OF THE RELIABILITY, SAFETY AND TIME-DOMAIN SENSITIVITY A. CALCULATION OF THE STATE PROBABILITY
According to the state transition diagram of the system, which is shown in Fig. 3 , the transfer rate matrix of the Markov process can be obtained as
where a ij (i = j) is the transfer rate of state i to j, which can be obtained from Fig. 3 . Particularly, the diagonal elements, namely, a ii , can be obtained via the following equation:
Define the probability of the system being in state k at time t as p k (t) = Pr(X (t) = k).
The probability vector is P(t) = [p 0 (t), p 1 (t), . . . , p 28 (t)], which will satisfy the following equations:
B. RELIABILITY
Reliability is defined as that the ability of a functional unit to perform a required function under given conditions for a given time interval. According to the state definitions of the system, when the system is in state S00-S08, S10-S13, S15 or S17, it can perform the demanded function. Therefore, the reliability of the system can be expressed as Safety is defined as that the freedom from unacceptable risk of physical injury or of damage to the health of people, either directly or indirectly as a result of damage to property or to the environment. In the electrical control system of the SCM, when undetectable failures occur, the SCM could be in a dangerous state. At this time, the system cannot identify the failure; hence, the system is operated in a failure state.
The safety defined in this paper is probability that any dangerous failure will not occur, and it is used to measure the degree of safety of the system. According to the state definitions of the system, when the system is in functional state or failure safe state, the system is safety. Therefore, the safety of the system can be expressed as
D. SENSITIVITY IN THE TIME INTERVAL
Sensitivity analysis (SA) is the study of how the uncertainty in the output of a model (numerical or otherwise) can be apportioned to different sources of uncertainty in the model input [39] . Because reliability and safety are functions of time t, the effect of each parameter on the system varies with time. Therefore, time should be introduced into the sensitivity analysis model. In Morris screening method, the value of each element x i from the input vector x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ) is mapped to [0, 1] and discretized to values from {0, 1/(p − 1), 2/(p − 1), . . . , 1}, where k and p are the number of input parameters and the number of sample points, respectively. For an input vector x, define the elementary effect of the ith input at time t as
where is a predetermined multiple of 1/(p-1) and
An m-by-k random matrix C * can be obtained by Morris screening method. In matrix C * , the value of each element is randomly selected from the {0, 1/(p − 1), 2/(p − 1), . . . , 1}, and any two adjacent rows have different values for only one element, and the difference is .
By taking each row in matrix C * as an input parameter to the model, the elementary effect of each input parameter at a given time t can be obtained. Suppose there is an input parameter with n trajectories. The sensitivity mean (d * (x i , t)) and standard deviation (S(x i , t) ) of the i th input parameter the observed elementary effect at time t can be expressed as [46] 
where d j (x i , t) is the elementary effect of i th input parameter for the jth trajectory. d * (x i , t) and S(x i , t) are used to measure the sensitivity of the input parameter and its degrees of interaction with other parameters, respectively. The sensitivity mean and standard deviation of the i th input parameter in the time interval [t 1 , t 2 ] can be obtained by averaging (11) and (12), respectively, and can be expressed as
To facilitate calculation, approximate and discrete equations of the sensitivity mean and standard deviation of the i th input parameter in the time interval [t 1 , t 2 ] are proposed:
where r is the number of sample points in [t 1 , t 2 ] and t s is the corresponding time of the s th sample point, for s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r}. Via the above process, the sensitivity analysis of each input parameter can be realized in the time domain and the sensitivity level in a time interval can be objectively and accurately evaluated on the basis of a large amount of random simulation data with equal probability.
V. ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION OF THE RELIABILITY, SAFETY AND SENSITIVITY

A. ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION OF THE RELIABLITY AND SAFETY
Based on the fourth/fifth-order Runge-Kutta algorithm, (7) can be solved in MATLAB. Then, the probabilities, namely, p 0 (t)-p 28 (t), can be obtained in the various states for various values of t, β, λ I , λ C , λ O , and λ COM in the model. Finally, R(t) and S(t) can be obtained by solving (8) and (9) .
In this paper, each factor is disturbed by a 1% fixed step size. Namely, when the other factors are set to constant typical values, 1% of the typical values are selected as the step sizes for disturbance in the ranges of the factor values. Then, the model is solved in MATLAB to analyze the reliability and safety of the electrical control system of the SCM. The input, CPU, and output modules are symmetric in the reliability model; hence, their effects on the system are the same. In this study, the input module is selected as a representative for analysis. According to the above analysis, the data that are obtained from the calculation of the reliability and safety at time t and for each factor can be mapped onto a wireframe surface.
1) RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
The color-mapped wireframe surfaces of the reliability at time t and for each factor are shown in Fig. 4 . As we expected, the system reliability decreases over time. According to Fig. 4(a) , the effect of c on the reliability is almost zero; c only affects whether the failure is detected and does not affect whether the failure occurs. Namely, when the system fails, c only determines whether the failure is a dangerous failure. Therefore, when its value is relatively high, it has a low effect on the reliability. According to Fig. 4(b)-4(d) , a high value of β and high failure rate of each module (λ I , λ C , λ O , and λ COM ) will accelerate the decrease of the system reliability. Because there are two input, CPU and output modules in each subsystem and the failure of any of them can lead to the failure of the corresponding subsystem, the effects of λ I , λ C , and λ O on the reliability are maximal. The effects of β and λ COM on the reliability are smaller than those of λ I , λ C , and λ O because the value of β is typically small and there is only one comparator module in each subsystem; the effects of β and λ COM are very similar. 
2) SAFETY ANALYSIS
The color-mapped wireframe surfaces of the safety at time t and for each factor are shown in Fig. 5 . As we expected, the safety of the system decreases over time. According to Fig. 5(a) , a large value of c will slow the decrease of the safety and its effect on the safety is maximal because it determines whether the failure is safe. When c = 1, the safety of the system is 1. According to Fig. 5(b) and 5(d) , a high value of β and a high failure rate of the comparator will accelerate the decrease of the safety. Because a common-cause failure can result in the simultaneous failure of multiple modules and an undetectable failure of a comparator module may cause the system to enter a dangerous state, they have important effects on safety. Fig. 5(c) shows that λ I , λ C or λ O have small effects on the system safety because any failure of these modules can be detected via the system comparison mechanism.
B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND SIMULATION OF RELIABILITY AND SAFETY 1) SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF RELIABILITY
The simulation parameters that are selected in this paper according to the sensitivity analysis in Section IV are listed in Table 3 . Because early failure of the SCM is a major concern, the time interval for the sensitivity analysis is set as [0, 10000]. Based on the above parameters, the sensitivity mean and standard deviation curves as functions of time t of each factor's effect on reliability are shown in Fig. 6 .
According to Fig. 6(a) , the sensitivity mean of β decreases initially, then slowly increases to −0.01; the sensitivity mean of c is the minimum over all time, which increases slightly from zero to 0.005; the sensitivity means of λ I (λ C or λ O ) and λ COM decrease from zero to −0.16 and −0.07, and exceed β in 1800 hours and 3900 hours, respectively.
According to Fig. 6(b) , all the sensitivity standard deviations increase with time; the sensitivity standard deviation of c is always the minimum because it has a very small effect on reliability and increases from zero to 0.0007; because β is related to each module, its sensitivity standard deviation increases initially, varies within a range, and, finally, increases to 0.0058; the sensitivity standard deviation of λ I (λ C or λ O ) is almost always the highest because it has the largest effect on reliability, and increases from zero to 0.0082; the sensitivity standard deviation of λ COM always exceeds that of c because it has a larger effect on reliability, and it increase from zero to 0.0027. The sensitivity mean, standard deviation and ratio of each factor's effect on the reliability in the time interval [0, 10000 hours] are listed in Table 4 . An increase in the failure detection rate, namely, c, will help improve the system reliability (the sensitivity mean is positive); increases in the module failure rates, namely, λ I , λ C , λ O , and λ COM , and the common-cause failure factor, namely, β, will degrade the system reliability (the sensitivity means are negative); c has a small effect and λ I , λ C , and λ O have major effects on reliability, and λ I , λ C , and λ O has the maximum interaction degree and c has the minimum interaction degree with the other factors in the given time interval.
2) SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF SAFETY
The same method is used to analyze the sensitivity of the safety as for the reliability and the selected parameters are the same as in Table 3 . The sensitivity mean and standard deviation curves as functions of time t of each factor's effect on safety are shown in Fig. 7 .
According to Fig. 7(a) , the sensitivity mean of c is always the maximum because it directly affects the detection rate of the dangerous state, and increases from zero to 0.0125; the sensitivity means of λ I , λ C , and λ O are minimal because the failure of any one of these modules does not cause the system to enter a dangerous state, regardless of whether the failure is detectable, and decrease from zero to −0.0015; the sensitivity mean of λ COM always exceeds that of β and the sensitivity means of λ COM and β decrease from zero to −0.0052 and −0.0030, respectively. According to Fig. 7(b) , all the sensitivity standard deviations increase with time; the sensitivity standard deviation of c is always the maximum because it has the largest effect on the safety and is related to each module, and increases from zero to 0.0040; similarly, the sensitivity standard deviations of λ I , λ C , and λ O are minimal because they have the smallest effects on safety, and increase from zero to 0.0009; the sensitivity standard deviation of λ COM always exceeds that of β and the sensitivity standard deviations of λ COM and β increase from zero to 0.0035 and 0.0019, respectively.
The sensitivity mean, standard deviation and ratio of each factor's effect on the safety in the time interval [0, 10000 hours] are listed in Table 5 . An increase in the failure detection rate, namely, c, will help improve the system safety (the sensitivity mean is positive); increases in the module failure rates, namely, λ I , λ C , λ O , and λ COM , and the VOLUME 7, 2019 common-cause failure factor, namely, β, will degrade the system safety (the sensitivity means are negative); λ I , λ C , and λ O have small effects and c has a large effect on the safety; and c has the maximum interaction degree and λ I , λ C , and λ O have the minimum interaction degrees with the other factors in the given time interval.
According to the above analysis, the reliability is most sensitive to the input, CPU and output models; hence, decreasing their failure rates should efficiently improve the reliability. In contrast, the safety is most sensitive to the failure detection rate; hence, increasing the failure detection rate of each module should considerably improve the safety. The common-cause failure and the failure rate of the comparator have large effects on the reliability and safety; thus, decreasing them should improve the overall performance of the system.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the reliability and safety of the electrical control system of the SCM are analyzed based on Markov processes and the MBF model, and the effect of each factor on system reliability and safety is studied in the time interval via the Morris screening method. The following conclusions are drawn.
1) The reliability analysis method based on Markov processes and MBF model can be easier used to model and analyze the reliability and safety of a complex control system in practice due to parameters in MBF model can be estimated without data.
2) The sensitivity method on the basis of Morris screening method used in this paper is based on a large amount of random data with equal probability, and the interaction of each factor with other factors is also considered in the sensitivity model, so the result is more objective and more accurate compared to those of previous methods. The method can be used to evaluate effect of each factor on the system at any time t, and to quantify effect level of each factor on the system in the specified time interval, the results of sensitivity analysis can provide some reference for the improvement of the system.
3) In analysis of the effects on the reliability, the effect of failure detection rate increases slightly initially, then tends to be stable over time, and its interaction degree with other factors is similar as the above and its value is small; the effect of common-cause failure increases quickly initially, then decreases slightly over time, its interaction degree with other factors fluctuates and increases gradually over time, and its value is relatively large; the effects of the input, CPU, output and comparator modules increase slowly and the growth rates of the effects increase gradually in the initial stage, then the growth rates tend to be stable over time, their interaction degrees with other factors increase quickly initially, then tend to be stable over time, and interaction degree of the input, CPU or output module is almost always the largest, which is even bigger than that of the comparator module whose value is relatively large.
4) In analysis of the effects on the safety, the effect of each factor and its interaction degree with other factors increase linear mostly and the larger effect is combined with a larger interaction degree; the approximate relation of factor effects at any time is: c > λ COM > β > λ I = λ C = λ O . 5) In the specified time interval, the failure rates of the input, CPU, and output modules have major effects on the system reliability, and either of them accounts for 27.6% in effecting on the reliability; they have the highest interaction degrees with other factors in the effect analysis of the reliability. 6) In the specified time interval, the failure detection rate has the largest effect on the safety of system, and it accounts for 47.4% in effecting on the safety; it has the highest interaction degrees with other factors in the effect analysis of the safety. 7) In the specified time interval, the common-cause failure has some effects on the system reliability and safety, and it accounts for 5.3% and 12.7% in effecting on the reliability and safety, respectively. 8) In the specified time interval, the effects of failure rate of the comparator module on the system reliability and safety are bigger than the effects of common-cause, and it accounts for 11.1% and 24.6% in effecting on the reliability and safety, respectively. 
